Evidence is presented on twelve large acquisitions by telecommunications firms in Europe. Although the average effect on acquirers' shareholder value is not significantly different from zero, there is high dispersion in the results. This suggests that detailed studies may uncover important aspects of the constraints that exist in the corporate control market of telecommunications firms. A case study of the Spanish firm Telefonica suggests that corporate governance problems and political intervention are significant components of these constraints.
Introduction
Mergers, acquisitions and corporate control issues have shaken European The objective here is to find patterns of transactions in the market of corporate control in this period of deregulation 2 and technological change. Similar research has been undertaken for other industries (Kaplan, 2000) , such as banking (see Houston and Ryngaert,1994) or the airline industry in the US (Kole and Lehn,1997) . A preliminary answer is provided by presenting evidence on the 12 largest acquisitions made by European telecommunications firms up to June 2000, and by presenting a related case study of Telefonica. The case study sheds light on the corporate governance and political constraints suggested by the diversity of outcomes in the analysis of the 12 acquisitions. These constraints are difficult to perceive with 2 Deregulation is a common trigger of takeover waves (see Mitchell and Muhlerin, 1996) . 3 Other papers analyze mergers and acquisitions from the point of view of antitrust policy. See for example, Cox and Portes (1998) .This type of analysis is beyond the scope of my paper.
4 comparartive studies that use averaging techniques. Although there is a wide variety of cases, on average the acquisitions had an impact on shareholder value that does not significantly differ from zero. 4 The Spanish firm shows that the incentives provided by stock markets and political constraints both interact in shaping the control structure of the sector.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical developments that may shed light on acquisitions and control of telecommunications firms, and it presents a typology of deals, as well as some of the constraints faced by the potential transactions. Section 3 shows the quantitative evidence on the effects of twelve large acquisitions on the shareholder value of bidding European telecommunication firms. Section 4 analyzes in depth the case of
Telefonica. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.
The Control Market of Telecommunications Firms: Theory, Typology and

Constraints
Deregulation of telecommunications in Europe has been characterized by the liberalization of entry since 1998, which coincided with rapid technological change, the creation of the single currency and the consolidation of the single market. These important changes in the environment of telecommunication firms change industry boundaries and the optimal scale and scope of activities (see Laffont and Tirole, 2000) . An important difference between Europe and the US is the absence in Europe 5 of line of business restrictions. The American control market has been better studied, both through case studies (Lys and Vincent, 1995) and more general overviews (Ware, 1998) .
The main benefits of mergers and acquisitions in telecommunications are the achievement of scale through consumer base and scope through convergence or vetical integration. It may also be beneficial for shareholders, although socially inefficient, to increase market power. However, mergers and acquisitions may also be value destroying from the shareholders' point of view for reasons that are well known to the empirical literature: agency problems, hubrys, lack of focus (see Oxera, 1995) .
Firms may grow beyond their original markets through a variety of transactions, which may be carried out nationally or internationally. The following is a nonexhaustive list of potential deals:
-Acquisitions of non-controlling stakes.
-Global Alliances.
-Joint Ventures.
-Spin-off (of the "new economy" segments or of the network assets) plus merger.
-Mergers of equals.
-Acquisitions of controlling stakes.
The following general trend has been observed over time. Until the mid 90s the usual strategy for the largest companies was to seek Global Alliances. These were abandoned and in the middle of the decade the most usual deal was to acquire noncontrolling stakes. In the second half of the nineties some attempted mergers of equals took place, but most of them were stopped for a variety of reasons, frequently of a political nature. In 1999 and 2000 it can be observed that the acquisition of controlling stakes has increased in the companies under study. On average, these acquisitions produced an abnormal return of 2.71% on the stock price of the acquiring firms, which is not significantly different from zero.
Acquisitions by Large European Telecommunications Companies
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The variance of the distribution of abnormal returns is high. There are two acquisitions with a significant negative abnormal return at the 99% level (the two by Telefonica) and one of them with a significant positive abnormal return, the acquisition of E-plus by KPN. In all other cases, the abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero. The t-statistics used to test for statistical significance are based on the standard deviation of the time series of market adjusted returns for each security in a way that is standard in the event study literature.
As opposed to other studies that only take into account the announcement effects, the table reflects the impact on shareholder value of all information released 7 See Fama et al. (1969) , Armitage (1995) and Binder (1998) .
8 Zero or negative average bidder's abnormal returns are consistent with two theories of managerial behaviour. The hubrys hypothesis argues that managers overestimate their abilities and overpay for the target. The agency hypothesis argues that acquisitions reflect that the optimal size of the firm from the manager's point of view is larger than the optimal size from the shareholder's point of view. See Weston et al. (1998) . The agency hypothesis is further explored below for the case of Telefonica.
between announcement and completion of the deals, in a way similar to Houston and Ryngaert (1994) .
Dynamic issues
The evidence analyzed reveals that many questions can only be answered taking a dynamic perspective. For example, some deals are the trigger for other deals. The Two phenomena are worth mentioning in this respect:
1)Bad bidders may become good targets (see Mitchell and Lehn, 1990) . For example, Telecom Italia had accumulated several failed alliances, top management changes and a messy acquisitions policy before it was taken over by Olivetti in 1999.
2)Firms that have been taken over by acquirers may be divested and the spun off segments may be important participants in the corporate control market both as bidders or as targets (e.g. Mannesmann). Viceversa, spin-offs may be subsequent to acquiring groups of firms in the same segment. For example, Telefonica acquired
Internet companies and then decided to spin-off Terra as a global Internet company.
Takeovers (see Bhagat et al., 1990) , privatization (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1995) and regulation 9 interact in determining the ownership structure of telecommunications firms and the industry structure of the whole sector. The influence of politics in the history of corporate finance is a well known phenomenon (see for example Cantillo, 1998) .
The Case of Telefonica
It is interesting to analyze more in depth the case of Telefonica, because it has been deemed one of the examples of success in an acquisitions strategy (see de Figueiredo and Spiller, 2000) . Also, because it was under a corporate governance regime that made it significantly different from other telecommunications operators in Europe, since it was fully privatized with a highly dispersed shareholding but was under a 10 year golden share. Telefonica is the first Spanish firm in profits, income, and equity value. As of 1999, it had 50 million clients in 11 countries (Europe and Latin America).
I show the impact on shareholder value of its diversification strategy and the mechanisms of managerial discipline that constraned such strategy. The behaviour of the company is consistent with the hypothesis that the government was de facto the large blockholder.
9 According to Sidak and Spulber (1997) the regulatory burdens on the incumbents imposed by the 1996
Telecommunications Act in the US forced them to a spin-off strategy of the value creating segments, separating the network assets. Similarly, stringent regulation has forced British Telecom to study the spinoff of its network assets (FT, 28-7-00).
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( The remainder of this section focuses on this period.
After complete privatization, Telefonica's shareholders base widened. A look at the technical design of 1995 and 1997 POs shows the mechanisms through which this happened. Both offers included discounts on the final price for small investors (4 percent for general investors and 8 percent for employees). Also, both POs included fidelity bonuses for small investors: that is, the promise of getting 1 free share for every 20 shares bought provided that the investor did not sell the shares during one year after the PO). Rationing was needed in both POs, since small investors demand was largely in excess of the supply directed to them. The ratio demand/offer was 7.3 in 1995 and 7.2 in 1997.
The previous management of Telefonica had already started a very ambitious investment activity in Latin America, with controlling stakes in Chile, Argentina and Peru's largest telecommunications operators when they were privatized. The new management maintained this policy. However, it shifted international alliances, leaving Unisource to reach an agreement with WorldCom and MCI.
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The activities of the new management in the media sector triggered accusations of collusion with the government in its aim to create a media holding to compete with Prisa, a dominant media holding with important stakes in radio, TV and newspapers.
Beyond the operations of Lycos and Endemol analyzed above, the following table analyzes previous deals. The abnormal returns are computed using a three day event window and t-statistics have been computed using the standard deviation of the time series of residuals using a market model. (Table 3 about here)
The picture that arises from the data is somehow contrary to expectations. Telefonica that tried to control.
From this evidence, the most that can be said is that investors may value the scope economies in a frontier business such as media, but also that some of the moves into this sector may have been motivated by non-economic reasons. There is probably a trade off between productive synergies and private benefits from control (which are potentially substantial in a high profile industry such as media, where these benefits can additionally be shared collusively with politicians).
In 1999, Telefonica was the first operator in Latin America, being present in Argentina, Chile, Peru, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, El Salvador, Guatemala and Brazil.
In the media sector, it participates in Antena3TV and Via Digital in television, in the newspapers Expansion and Marca and in the radio network Onda Cero, among others.
In the four years that Villalonga had been Chairman of the company (June 1996
to July 2000), Telefonica had made the transition from being a Spanish telephony incumbent to become a global operator in the new economy. The company had international subsidiaries in the Internet sector, in mobile telephony and in media. As the floatation of the Internet subsidiary Terra in 1999 and its subsequent acquisition of US Lycos shows, its strategy was to spin off the value creating subsidiaries without losing control and establish alliances and mergers with the spun off segments.
The fact that the specific acquisition events analyzed failed to create value for shareholders in a positive and significant way suggests two possible explanations.
The first one is that the new borders of the company had been anticipated by the stock market participants and its final details did not add substantial new information. And the second one is that the motivation for most of the deals revealed an agency problem in the firm. In this case, the managerial team would be interested in 14 expansion projects that are not necessarily positive net present value projects for shareholders, but that may maximize some managerial objective. Next I probe the effectiveness in Telefonica of the usual mechanisms that the literature has identified to discipline managers. In case these mechanisms are proved to be ineffective, it will be evidence of a potential agency problem in the firm.
-Takeovers.
The government announced a 10 year Golden Share on Telefonica on 8/11/96.
The golden share is a departure from the one share one vote rule that implicitly gives incentives to the government to behave as the main blockholder. On 24/6/97 an extraordinary shareholders meeting approved defensive measures according to which, The appointment of nine ''independent'' directors was also interpreted as a move to a more controlled Board by the Chairman, Juan Villalonga. In addition to that, a leaner hierarchy was achieved by eliminating the position of CEO. On 15/1/97
Telefonica announced that coinciding with total privatization it would reduce to 18 the number of Directors.
-Hard core.
Besides the enlargement of the shareholders base, a 'hard core' of financial investors had been constituted since the mid nineties, although it has been losing importance over time. Three financial institutions (two banks and one saving bank)
held stakes around 5 percent of total capital: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, Argentaria and La Caixa.
The hard core of shareholders was kept in place after appointment of the new management and full privatization. However, these institutions remained passive in all the changes that undertook the company during these years. They did not show opposition to Villalonga until the government showed its own opposition in 2000, first with the KPN merger and subsequently with the forced departure of the Chairman.
-Large block holders.
The shareholding of Telefonica in 1996 was as follows (El Pais, 27-7-00 As it will be seen when we analyze the forced departure of Villalonga, it is the government who acts as a blockholder in practice, using the threat to use the golden share and using its especial relationship with the hard core of shareholders.
-The managers' labour market
When Villalonga was appointed, his background signalled a move to a strategy constrained by a broader managerial market that could allow him to pursue his career in the future.
-Institutional investors activism.
The internationalization of the company had increased the participation of European and US mutual and pension funds. However, these funds have not been active in campaigns to change the strategy of the company or to replace the managerial team.
-Best practice in corporate governance.
Villalonga had pledged upon appointment to introduce corporate governance reforms ''including recommendations of the most prestigious reports''. However, the stock exchange regulator (Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores) has failed to include Telefonica amongst the firms that fulfill the best practice corporate governance recommendations in Spain (Codigo Olivencia). However, Telefonica's shares are traded in 11 different stock exchanges, including the NYSE. This suggests that the company is subject to an important degree of financial discipline and transparency.
-Financial Policy
The most significant change in the recent past has been the new dividend policy announced in 1998. Telefonica announced that it would not distribute dividends, with the objective of having more funds available for an aggressive investment policy.
The stock prices reacted positively to the new dividend policy. Increasing cash-flow for investment was deemed value-enhancing at that point. 12 Telefonica ceased to be committed to regular payments to external investors to a significant degree. To this extent, it fits an important condition for the company to be analyzed under the lens of the "free cash flow theory" (see Jensen, 1986 ).
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-Incentive pay.
An incentive plan to reward 100 high executives with stock options was approved in 1997 and it was extended to 450 executives in 1997. All Telefonica'
workers were promised similar plans in 2000, when the plans were being most controversial in the public opinion.
The comparison between Telecom Italia and other European incumbents after TI was taken over by
Olivetti illustrates the costs and benefits of acquisition strategies. TI has adopted a very different strategy from Telefonica or other incumbents. Its highly leveraged structure after the takeover has the virtue of instilling strict discipline at TI, not unlike that of a classic 1980s leveraged buy-out.
TI's new management has cut costs, pruned wasteful investment, geared up and made great efforts to sweat the company's assets, achieving the highest return on capital of all the big European telecom com-panies. First quarter capital expenditure was 19 per cent lower than the year before -possibly too low.
(FT: Lex Column: July 16 2000) 13 See also Thompson (1999) .
With the exception of the incentive pay and the pressure of several stock markets, most of the internal and external mechanisms to discipline the managers in Telefonica are largely ineffective.
Some of the executives who have left the company argue (FT, 25July 2000) that "Mr Villalonga's compulsive deal-making and intoxication with success have led to strategic mistakes -notably, the costly acquisition of a stable of media companies which they believe could dent future profitability." The final straw was his inability to mend fences with the government when Telefónica was negotiating internet connection charges, local telephone tariffs and liberalisation of the domestic market. His forced replacement is similar to a typical management change forced by a block 14 A few days before the Chairman's resignation, the financial press argued that the campaign to remove Juan Villalonga, Telefonica's chairman, was unsettling investors and could harm the company. A coup by BBVA and La Caixa would signal that Telefonica had other masters to serve.
Looking beyond personalities, the basic problem is that Telefonica has its roots as a Spanish company.
Spain's government and national banks are unwilling to surrender their influence over what is increasingly a genuine multinational. But surrender they must if Spain's new breed of globally ambitious companies is to compete successfully on the world stage.
FT: Lex Column: July 18 2000 21 shareholder, although in this case the block shareholder is de facto the government, through the threat to use its golden share and through its relationship with the core de iure shareholders (see Warner et al., 1988) .
Villalonga had been appointed by the Spanish government when the company had still the state as the largest shareholder in 1996. For a long time, the Chairman had been understood to be the government's man in the company, and the hard core of shareholders did nothing to undermine his powerful position. However, since late 1999, the high profile of Villalonga, the stock options plan and his unrelenting dealmaking, were starting to be politically costly for his political principals. The 
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To summarize the constraints derived from the government's influence, there was a system of bad corporate governance (too dispersed shareholding, inoperative board due to weak hard core and "independent" shareholders) driven by the wish to leave the managerial team a broad room of manoeuvre to pursue government-related objectives; the golden share prevented the operation of an efficient control market;
the electoral cycle clearly interfered with the operations of the company. The policy of managerial discretion decided upon privatization eventually backfired to the government: the managerial team was so autonomous that it no longer served its political masters. The European Commission had made it clear its opposition to the golden shares, and the Spanish shareholders were a minority after completion of Latin American takeovers. The Spanish government wanted to reassert its control before it was too late.
The company was still successful because it could use its very large customer base and generous cash flows in Spain and Latin American to pursue an ambitious expansion policy in the new economy (de Figueiredo and Spiller, 2000) but political factors still constrained its behaviour, as it has been shown. Such political constraints should amount to a heavier burden in other companies that do not start with such a solid starting point.
Conclusions
The costs and benefits of acquisitions compensate each other on average for the 12 largest telecommunications acquisitions in Europe in the recent past. The 23 variety of outcomes suggests that detailed company studies may uncover the constraints that the control market faces and that may prevent it from achieving results that have positive wealth effects for shareholders. The case of Telefonica reveals that political constraints play a crucial role in shaping the market for corporate control in European telecommunications.
In practice, a golden share regime does not seem to be very different from a partial privatization regime, since the government still operates as the main blockholder. However, it is probably better some government control than no control at all.
Newbery (2000) has suggested that public and private regulated firms with similar industrial structures deliver similar outcomes. First mover advantages (e.g., The results of this research suggest that:
-There is no evidence of a significantly positive average effect on acquirers' market value of the completed transactions in the market for corporate control of European telecommunications firms.
-Some potentially positive net present value acquisitions are stopped for political reasons. Many deals that are not positive net present value projects are undertaken anyway because disciplinary mechanisms to control managers, especially in recently privatized firms, may be ineffective.
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-The industry seems to be looking for its equilibrium structure in a context of high uncertainty. Although the overall concentration process may be efficient (due to scale and scope economies), this does not imply that individual transactions all create value for shareholders, given that there is a huge separation between ownership and control in these firms, and that some of them have flawed mechanisms of corporate governance. This is especially accute in firms that are still under state control or that have been recently privatized.
European authorities face a trade-off between leaving the control market operate to better capture the efficiency gains of consolidation (subject to anti-trust policy) or maintaining some degree of control on telecommunications incumbents. While the European Commission seems to be pushing for a freer market, the national governments are still reluctant to give up some (formal or informal) key control mechanisms. Telefonica buys 100 hundred radio stations in Spain.
-1.99 (-1.08) Note: the abnormal returns have been computed using a market model with a three day event window (day before, announcement day and day after). The t-statistics are computed using the standard deviation of the time series of residuals.
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Figure 1: Telefonica compared to other European telcos
